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1 
Investigating the Effectiveness of Response Strategies for Vulnerabilities to 
Corruption in the Chinese Public Construction Sector 
Abstract 
Response strategy is a key for preventing widespread corruption vulnerabilities in the 
public construction sector. Although several studies have been devoted to this area, 
the effectiveness of response strategies has seldom been evaluated in China. This 
study aims to fill this gap by investigating the effectiveness of response strategies for 
corruption vulnerabilities through a survey in the Chinese public construction sector. 
Survey data obtained from selected experts involved in the Chinese public 
construction sector were analyzed by factor analysis and partial least 
squares-structural equation modeling. Analysis results showed that four response 
strategies of leadership, rules and regulations, training, and sanctions, only achieved 
an acceptable level in preventing corruption vulnerabilities in the Chinese public 
construction sector. This study contributes to knowledge by improving the 
understanding of the effectiveness of response strategies for corruption vulnerabilities 
in the public construction sector of developing countries.  
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Introduction 
Corruption vulnerabilities in the public construction sector have raised in various 
countries around the world, particularly in those developing ones, which are caused 
by continual economic growth and rapid urbanization worldwide (Transparency 
International 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011). Corruption vulnerabilities can ruin the public 
construction sector at multiple levels and lead to underperformance of public projects, 
such as quality defects, cost overruns and delivery delay (Kenny 2009). It is estimated 
that corruption vulnerabilities may result in a loss ratio of project cost ranging from 
10% to 50% (Jain 2001). Therefore, a growing number of research efforts have been 
devoted to related issues in recent years (Alutu 2007; Sohail and Cavill 2008; de Jong 
et al. 2009; Bowen et al. 2012; Tabish and Jha 2011, 2012; Gunduz and Önder 2013; 
Le et al. 2014a, 2014b). 
 Corruption vulnerabilities commonly exist in both developed and developing 
countries with various political and economic systems (Ehrlich and Lui 1999; 
Cendrowski et al. 2007; Melgar et al. 2009). As a result of the lack of mature 
legislative and institutional systems, developing countries face a greater challenge in 
preventing corruption than developed countries do (Ofori 2000). China is one 
example. For instance, the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention reported 15,010 
cases of corruption recorded in the public construction sector between 2009 and 2011, 
which caused an estimated loss of CNY 3 billion (approximately USD 490 million) 
(Xinhua Net 2011). The serious corruption situation has forced the government to pay 
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3 
more attention to anti-corruption issues and improve relevant supervision in the 
Chinese public construction sector (Xinhua Net 2009).  
Various response strategies, such as economic (e.g., raising wage level, tax 
reform), administrative (e.g., public procurement reform, decentralization of 
decision-making), political (e.g., political competition, transparency in party 
financing), legislative (e.g., anti-corruption legislation, respect for the rule of law), 
and auditing strategies (e.g., independent judiciary, independent/free media), have 
been proposed in previous studies to mitigate corruption vulnerabilities (Riley 1998; 
Chandler 2002; Desta2006; Peisakhin and Pinto 2010; Karhunen and Ledyaeva 2012; 
Klinkhammer 2013). However, few studies have evaluated the effectiveness of these 
response strategies. Therefore, this study focuses on the Chinese public construction 
sector, and aims to evaluate the effectiveness of existing response strategies by 
examining its relationships with corruption vulnerabilities. 
Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development 
The conceptual framework of this study was developed based on Tabish and Jha 
(2011, 2012), which investigated corruption vulnerabilities and response strategies in 
the Indian public project procurement. Their frameworks were adopted as the 
theoretical foundation of this study for the following reasons. First, few researchers, 
apart from Tabish and Jha (2011, 2012), have examined the vulnerabilities to 
corruption and response strategies in the public construction sector of developing 
countries. Second, China and India have many similar aspects, such as close locations, 
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economy, population and industrial structures (Cheng et al. 2007). Most importantly, 
both China and India are undergoing rapid urbanization and face a similar challenge 
of preventing corruption in the public construction sector (Le et al. 2014b). 
Furthermore, in order to make the framework of Tabish and Jha (2011, 2012) to fit 
with the Chinese context, a series of interviews were conducted by interviewing with 
experienced experts in China.  
Corruption Vulnerabilities 
Corruption vulnerabilities play a critical role in corruption research, particularly in 
developing countries which lack a sound legislative and administrative system (Doig 
1997; Lee et al. 2010). Sohail and Cavill (2008) outlined various corruption 
vulnerabilities and related stakeholders in the project execution and delivery process. 
Tabish and Jha (2011) further conceived key corruption vulnerabilities in public 
procurement in terms of irregularities. In their study, Tabish and Jha (2011) identified 
61 irregularities in the Indian public procurement projects, and categorized these 
irregularities into five groups, namely transparency, professional standards, fairness, 
contract monitoring and regulation, and procedural accountability irregularities. Based 
on the aforementioned consideration, these five groups and their affiliated 
irregularities were used in this study as the initial measurement framework of 
corruption vulnerabilities in the Chinese public construction sector.  
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Response Strategies 
According to Tabish and Jha (2012), the response strategies for corruption 
vulnerabilities in the public construction sector consist of four constructs, namely, 
leadership, rules and regulations, training, and sanctions.  
Leadership can develop and facilitate values of integrity in an organization 
which are manifested in via appropriate actions (Tabish and Jha 2012). An eligible 
leader always communicates values of integrity to the rest of the organization and 
creates conditions that motivate people to behave in an upright way (Sööt 2012). 
Meanwhile, the openness and strictness of leaders are also found to have a direct 
impact on the frequency of integrity violations by employees (Huberts et al. 
2007).Therefore, selecting good leaders is vital for an organization to fight against 
potential corruption vulnerabilities (Mumford et al. 2003).  
Harboring the belief that corruption can be completely curbed without rules and 
regulations is perhaps naive given the long history of corruption in business and the 
understanding of the human behavior that cannot be disciplined under a circumstance 
without any constraint (Ashforth et al. 2008). Rules and regulations have been 
deemed as the core component of anti-corruption strategies, because an organization 
must implement its mission and vision of anti-corruption policies with the aid of 
relevant rules and regulations (Klitgaard 1988; Ivancevich et al. 2003; Tabish and Jha 
2012). A thorough regulation system is usually developed to increase transparency 
and accountability and to enforce penal codes against corruption, and can thus aid the 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
6 
“good guys” in controlling unsavory competitors and creating an impartial playing 
field (Ashforth et al. 2008; Misangyi et al. 2008).  
Imposing training on industry practitioners is indispensable to corruption 
prevention in the construction industry (Smith 2009). This is because training can 
help practitioners acquire knowledge on the damaging effects of corruption on society 
and teach them corruption risk in the project execution and concrete skills coping for 
these risks (Boehm and Nell 2007; Schwartz 2004, 2009). Many international 
associations, such as the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, the 
American Society of Civil Engineers, the U.K. Institution of Civil Engineers, the U.K. 
Chartered Institute of Building, and the U.K. Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 
have incorporated training as an important component into their anti-corruption 
guidelines (Boyd and Padilla 2009; Crist Jr. 2009; Le et al. 2014a).  
Sanctions should be imposed for corrupt practices that have been caught (Tabish 
and Jha 2012). Imposed sanctions is an indispensable response strategy that is 
affected by four factors, namely, probability of being caught, enforcement, 
independence of the judiciary from politicians, and equal access to the law for every 
one (Arvey and Ivancevich 1980; Jain 2001; Mulder et al. 2009). An adequate 
sanction can curb corruption, because the harsh punishment will undoubtedly change 
the cost-benefit calculation of potential corruptors, particularly in cases when the risk 
of being caught is sufficiently high (Johannsen and Pedersen 2012).  
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Hypothesis Development 
A hypothesized model (Figure 1) based on the aforementioned conceptual framework 
was proposed to investigate the relationships between corruption vulnerabilities and 
response strategies in the Chinese public construction sector. As shown in Figure 1, 
response strategies in the hypothesized model are considered a four-dimensional and 
second-order construct composed of leadership, rules and regulations, training, and 
sanctions. Corruption vulnerabilities are deemed as a five-dimensional and 
second-order construct composed of transparency, professional standards, fairness, 
contract monitoring and regulation, and procedural accountability irregularities. The 
development of the model adopted the second-order construct approach recommended 
by Wetzels et al. (2009), because it maximizes the interpretability of both 
measurement and hierarchical models. In the proposed model, the hypothesis that 
response strategies are negatively correlated with corruption vulnerabilities in the 
public construction sector, is to be tested. 
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Figure 1 Hypothesized model of corruption vulnerabilities and response strategies 
Research Methodology 
The whole research process consists of four steps. First, a hypothesized model for 
defining the relationships between corruption vulnerabilities and response strategies 
was formulated based on Tabish and Jha (2011, 2012). Second, the model was refined 
by interviewing with selected experts to fit in the Chinese context. Third, a 
questionnaire instrument was developed based on the refined framework, and was 
used in the survey to collect opinioned-based data from target respondents. Lastly, 
both factor analysis (FA) and partial least squares structural equation modeling 
(PLS-SEM) were conducted to analyze the data collected and validate the 
hypothesized model. Qualitative and quantitative methods were sequentially adopted 
in this study. Results obtained from diverse methods can triangulate and complement 
each other, thus yielding stronger and more reliable findings (Xia et al. 2009; Zhao et 
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9 
al. 2014).  
Interviews 
To verify the hypothesized model derived from Tabish and Jha (2011, 2012) and make 
it fit in with the Chinese context, a series of face-to-face interviews were conducted 
between July and August 2013. Each interview contains two sections. In Section A, 
the interviewee was asked to provide his/her opinion on the measurement items of 
response strategies of Tabish and Jha (2012), in terms of their involvement in the 
Chinese public construction sector. In Section B, the interviewee was asked to provide 
his/her opinions on the measurement items of corruption vulnerabilities derived from 
Tabish and Jha (2011) in terms of five-point Likert scale: “1-strongly disagree,” 
“2-disagree,” “3-neutral,” “4-agree,” and “5-strongly agree.” Each interviewee was 
also encouraged to supplement the measurement items of corruption vulnerabilities 
that were not recorded in the interview.  
A total of 14 experienced industrial and academic experts were invited to 
participate in the interviews. To ensure the reliability and quality of interviews, a 
purposive approach was adopted to select interviewees. All the interviewees had at 
least ten-year experience in the public construction sector and senior positions within 
their organizations. The selection of interviewees also considered the diversity of 
professional expertise of experts, which helped increase the heterogeneity of the 
interview panel and thus improve the validity of interviews. Table 1 shows the 
backgrounds of interviewees. 
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Table 1 Backgrounds of interviewees 
No. Employer Position Years of experience Largest project ever 
managed/consulted 
A Government  Director  20 USD 363 million 
B Government  Deputy Director 16 USD 308 million 
C Client  Project Manager 19 USD 363 million 
D Client  Project Manager  17 USD 308 million 
E Client  Director 13 USD 167 million 
F Contractor  General Manager 25 USD 363 million 
G Contractor  Project Manager  20 USD 122 million 
H Contractor  Director  15 USD 85 million 
I Consultant General Manager 20 USD 363 million 
J Consultant  Project Manager 16 USD 122 million 
K Consultant Project Manager 15 USD 85 million 
L Academic Professor 22 USD 197 million 
M Academic Professor 17 USD 73 million 
N Academic Associate Professor  13 USD 363 million 
All interviewees agreed with the applicability of Tabish and Jha’s (2012) 
categorization of response strategies for corruption vulnerabilities in the Chinese 
context. Only a few statements of measurement items were adjusted as suggested by 
interviewees. According to Interviewees A, C, and L, the items of ‘fear of suspension’, 
‘fear of disciplinary action’, and ‘fear of caution/warning letter’ proposed by Tabish 
and Jha (2012) were revised to ‘fear of economic sanction’, ‘fear of penal sanction’, 
and ‘fear of administrative sanction’, respectively. 
According to the interview feedback, the mean score of each measurement item 
of Tabish and Jha (2011) was calculated. Only those achieving a value of 2.5 or above 
were used in the final questionnaire for the survey. This method is suggested by 
Hsueh et al. (2009). Finally, 19 measurement items regarding corruption 
vulnerabilities were extracted and used in the questionnaire survey (Table 2). In 
addition, five new measurement items (i.e., contractors provide false certificates in 
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bidding, substitution of unqualified materials in construction, site supervisor neglects 
his duties for taking bribe from contractor, confidential information of bidding is 
disclosed to a specific bidder, and a large project should have called for bids is split 
into several small projects and contracted without bidding) regarding corruption 
vulnerabilities advocated by most experts were added to elaborate the hypothesized 
model and make a tailor fit with the Chinese context (Table 3). Correspondingly, five 
categories of corruption vulnerabilities were renamed as opacity (formerly 
transparency), immorality (formerly professional standards), unfairness (formerly 
fairness), contractual violation (formerly contract monitoring and regulation), and 
procedural violation (formerly procedural accountability). Figure 2 shows the revised 
hypothesized model. 
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Table 2 Measurement items of corruption vulnerabilities 
Construct Code Measurement item Evaluation Factor 
loading 
Variance 
explained 
Immorality IMM1 The work is not executed as per original design accorded 3.93 0.727 33.679% 
 IMM2 Work is executed without the availability of funds for the said purpose 3.93 0.474
Ⅱ
  
 IMM3 The changes, especially in abnormally high rated and high value items are not properly monitored and verified 3.29 0.696  
 IMM4
Ⅰ
 Contractors provide false certificates in bidding 3.96 0.673  
 IMM5
Ⅰ
 Substitution of unqualified materials in construction 3.54 0.735  
 IMM6
Ⅰ
 Site supervisor neglects his duties for taking bribe from contractor 3.91 0.750  
Unfairness UNF1 The consultant is not appointed after proper publicity and open competition 3.64 0.797 9.718% 
 UNF2 The criteria adopted in prequalification of consultant are restrictive and benefit only few consultants 3.43 0.849  
 UNF3 The selection of consultant not done by appropriate authority 3.57 0.451
Ⅱ
  
 UNF4 The criteria for selection of contractor are restrictive and benefit only few contractors  3.00 0.708  
 UNF5 The conditions/specifications are relaxed in favor of contractor to whom the work is being awarded 3.50 0.636  
 UNF6
Ⅰ
 Confidential information of bidding is disclosed to a specific bidder 3.76 0.654  
Opacity OPA1 Adequate & wide publicity is not given to tender 2.71 0.720 6.644% 
 OPA2 Adequate time for submission of tender/offer not given 2.64 0.482
Ⅱ
  
 OPA3 The evaluation of tenders is not done exactly as per the notified Criteria 2.57 0.752  
 OPA4 The negotiation on tender not done as per laid down guidelines 3.00 0.759  
 OPA5
Ⅰ
 A large project should have called for bids is split into several small projects and contracted without 
bidding 
3.40 0.616  
Procedural 
violation 
PRV1 Administrative approval and financial sanction not taken to execute the work 2.79 0.742 6.300% 
PRV2 Lack of the sanctioned financial provisions from the government 3.86 0.707  
PRV3 Work is not executed for the same purpose for which the sanction was accorded 2.93 0.640  
PRV4 The proper record of hindrances is not being maintained from the beginning  2.93 0.440
Ⅱ
  
Contractual COV1 Escalation clause is not applied correctly for admissible payment 3.57 0.746 5.281% 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
13 
Construct Code Measurement item Evaluation Factor 
loading 
Variance 
explained 
violation COV2 Compliance with conditions regarding deployment of technical staff not being followed by contractor  3.71 0.573  
COV3 The work order/supply order is not placed within justified rates 2.71 0.443
Ⅱ
  
Note: Ⅰ: IMM4, IMM5, IMM6, UNF6, and OPA5 were added by the interviewees; 
Ⅱ: IMM2, UNF3, OPA2, PRV4, and COV3 were excluded with factor loadings lower than 0.5. 
Table 3 Sources and evaluations of added measurement items 
Code Measurement item Interviewee Evaluation 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N  
LPIC6 Interpersonal connections    √ √ √  √  √ √ √  √ 3.96 
IMM4 Contractors provide false certificates in bidding √ √ √    √ √  √  √ √  3.96 
IMM5 Substitution of unqualified materials in construction √ √  √ √    √ √ √ √ √ √ 3.54 
IMM6 Site supervisor neglects his duties for taking bribe from contractor  √ √ √ √    √ √  √ √ √ 3.91 
UNF6 Confidential information of bidding is disclosed to a specific bidder √   √   √  √  √ √  √ 3.76 
OPA5 A large project should have called for bids is split into several small 
projects and contracted without bidding 
   √ √ √  √  √ √ √  √ 3.40 
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Figure 2 Refined hypothesized model 
Questionnaire Survey 
A questionnaire survey was administered based on the measurement items 
consolidated in the interviews. The target respondents included clients, contractors, 
designers, consultants, governmental officials, and academics involved in public 
construction projects in China. To maximize the number of potential respondents, a 
number of government agencies, research institutions, and companies within the 
construction industry were contacted. In the end, eight institutions, namely, (1) 
Research Institute of Complex Engineering & Management, Tongji University, (2) 
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Shanghai Construction Consultants Association, (3) Shanghai Xian Dai Architectural 
Design (Group) Co., Ltd., (4) School of Civil Engineering and Transportation, South 
China University of Technology, (5) College of Civil Engineering, Shenzhen 
University, (6) Construction Commission of Zhengzhou Municipality, (7) Zhengzhou 
Metro Group Co., Ltd., and (8) China Construction Eighth Engineering Division, 
agreed to facilitate the survey. They are all active players in the Chinese public sector. 
Each of them represents a huge number of governmental officials or industry 
professionals or researchers from a broad range of the entire sector. 
The questionnaire was dispatched between September and October 2013 via 
three channels. First, an online version of the questionnaire was developed and 
disseminated to the staff of the aforementioned supporting institutions. Second, hard 
copies of the questionnaire were also distributed in an industrial forum held in 
Shanghai. Some qualified attendants of this meeting were invited to participate in this 
survey. Third, field surveys were performed on sites in Shanghai (in the eastern 
China), Jinan city (in the eastern China), and Zhengzhou city (in the central China), 
respectively. The three survey channels in this study enhanced the maximized number 
of survey respondents. Lastly, 188 valid replies were recorded: 87 ones were from the 
online survey, 20 from the forum, and 81 from the field survey. Table 4 shows the 
backgrounds of respondents.  
Table 4 Backgrounds of respondents 
Personal 
attributes 
Categories Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
Organization Government 20 10.6 
 Client 43 22.9 
 Contractor 43 22.9 
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Personal 
attributes 
Categories Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
 Consultant 46 24.5 
 Designer 26 13.8 
 Academic 10 5.3 
Position Top managerial level (e.g. director, general 
manager, professor) 
49 26.1 
 Middle managerial level (e.g. project manager) 88 46.8 
 Professional (e.g. engineer, quantity surveyor) 51 27.1 
Years of 
experience 
>20 24 12.8 
11-20 40 21.3 
 6-10 76 40.4 
 <5 48 25.5 
Working place* Eastern China 63 33.5 
 Central China 55 29.2 
 Western China 37 19.7 
 Northeastern China 33 17.6 
Note: * Working places are divided into eastern China with GDP per capita about USD 8,600, central 
China with GDP per capita about USD 4,700, western China with GDP per capita about USD 4,400, 
and northeastern China with GDP per capita about USD 6,600, according to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (2012). 
Tools for Data Analysis 
Factor Analysis 
Factor Analysis (FA) is a statistical technique commonly adopted to identify a small 
number of individual factors beneath a set of interrelated variables (Choi et al. 2011). 
FA was conducted using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 17.0 to condense 
and summarize measurement items of corruption vulnerabilities and response 
strategies in this study. Principal Component Analysis was conducted to identify the 
underlying principal factors for its simplicity and distinctive capacity of 
data-reduction (Chan et al. 2010). To obtain principal factors for a clearer image, 
factor extraction with Promax Rotation and Kaiser Normalization suggested by 
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Conway and Huffcutt (2003) was conducted. Before FA, both Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity analyses were conducted to examine the 
appropriateness of employing FA technique in this study. According to Norusis (2008) 
and Choi et al. (2011), a KMO value should be higher than the 0.5 threshold; 
meanwhile the significance level of  Bartlett’s Test for Sphericity should also be 
small (e.g., p-value = 0.000). 
PLS-SEM 
PLS-SEM was adopted to test the hypothesis in the refined hypothesized model. 
PLS-SEM is a combined technique consisting of principal components analysis, path 
analysis, and regression to simultaneously evaluate theory and data (Aibinu and 
Al-Lawati 2010). PLS-SEM can estimate latent constructs as linear combinations of 
observable variables, and further estimate parameters for links among different 
constructs (Mohamed 2002). Additionally, PLS-SEM has a minimum requirement on 
sample size, but it can handle nonnormal data sets (Reinartz et al. 2009; Ringle et al. 
2012). Therefore, PLS-SEM was adopted in this study. 
Results of PLS-SEM include a set of measurement models and a structural model. 
In this study, four kinds of validity of the measurement models, namely, (1) internal 
consistency reliability; (2) indicator reliability; (3) convergent validity; and (4) 
discriminating validity, were assessed by three indicators, namely, Composite 
Reliability, Loadings of measurement items on the corresponding construct, and 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (Hair et al. 2011; Ning and Ling 2013; Zhao et al. 
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2013). Composite Reliability is used to assess the internal consistency reliability, 
whose value should be larger than 0.7 (Hair et al. 2011). Loadings of measurement 
items on the corresponding construct are used to assess the indicator reliability, whose 
value should be at least larger than 0.4 (Hair et al. 2011; Ning and Ling 2013). The 
AVE is used to evaluate the convergent validity, whose value should be larger than 0.5 
(Hair et al. 2011). Loadings of measurement items on the corresponding construct and 
the AVE are also used to evaluate the discriminating validity: the square root of the 
AVE of each construct should exceed the inter-construct correlation; a measurement 
item’s loading should be larger than all of its cross loadings (Cenfetelli and Bassellier 
2009; Hair et al. 2011; Zhao et al. 2013). Regarding the evaluation of the structural 
model, the significance of path coefficients was adopted with the aid of Bootstrapping 
(Hair et al. 2011; Ning and Ling 2013; Zhao et al. 2013). 
Analysis Results 
Factor Analysis 
Table 2 shows the FA results of measurement items of corruption vulnerabilities. Five 
constructs encapsulating 24 measurement items were generated. The KMO value is 
0.863. The total variance explained is 61.623%. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
produced x
2 
= 1308.051 (d.f. = 276, p = 0.000). Thus, all the statistical indicators were 
acceptable to conduct FA (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974; Norusis 2008). Hair et al. 
(2010) stated that the factor loading of each measurement item on its corresponding 
construct should be higher than 0.5. Therefore, IMM2, UNF3, OPA2, PRV4, and 
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COV3 were deleted from the list of measurement items. 
Table 5 shows the FA results of the measurement items of response strategies. 
Four constructs encapsulating 17 measurement items were generated, which is in line 
with the findings of Tabish and Jha (2012). The KMO value is 0.821. The total 
variance explained is 68.391%. The Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity produced x2 = 
1787.405 (d.f. = 136, p = 0.000). All the statistical indicators were also acceptable to 
conduct FA (Dziuban and Shirkey 1974; Norusis 2008).  
Table 5 Factor analysis results of measurement items of response strategies 
Construct Code Measurement items Factor 
loading 
Variance 
explained 
Leadership LEA1 Anti-Corruption issues are important 0.732 36.578% 
 LEA2 Act positively and cooperate 0.793  
 LEA3 Act decisively when anti-corruption issues are 
important 
0.806  
 LEA4 Praise for working honestly 0.823  
 LEA5 Remind each other to work fairly and honestly 0.739  
 LEA6 Provide help to work honestly 0.750  
 LEA7 Corruption free environment is provided 0.772  
Rules and 
regulations 
RAR1 Adequate source of information 0.836 11.360% 
RAR2 Rules protect us from vigilance cases 0.820  
 RAR3 Rules should be consulted by all 0.765  
 RAR4 Rules do not impose restrictions 0.641  
Training TRA1 Training is necessary 0.850 10.547% 
 TRA2 Training helps me 0.902  
 TRA3 Training helps in prevention of corrupt practices 0.670  
Sanction SAN1 Fear of administrative sanction 0.843 9.906% 
 SAN2 Fear of economic sanction 0.951  
 SAN3 Fear of penal sanction 0.891  
Evaluation of Measurement Models 
Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 show the evaluation results of measurement models. 
Table 6 shows that (1) all loadings are larger than 0.4 with t-values larger than 2.58, 
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indicating the acceptable indicator reliability (Hair et al. 2011; Ning and Ling 2013); 
(2) the values of Composite Reliability are over 0.7, suggesting a satisfactory level of 
reliability of internal indicators with each construct (Hair et al. 2011); (3) the AVE 
value of each construct is higher than 0.5, showing a satisfactory level of convergent 
validity of the constructs (Hair et al. 2011).  
Table 7 shows that the square root of the AVE value of each construct is higher 
than its squared correlation with any other construct. Table 8 indicates that each 
measurement item has the highest loading on the corresponding construct. These 
results indicate the high discriminate validity of the constructs (Cenfetelli and 
Bassellier 2009; Hair et al. 2011; Zhao et al. 2013).  
Table 6 Evaluation of measurement models 
Construct Code Loading T-value AVE CR 
LEA LEA1 0.7747 18.4748 0.6189 0.9189 
 LEA2 0.8291 31.4307   
 LEA3 0.8332 31.9189   
 LEA4 0.7800 22.5243   
 LEA5 0.6849 14.8957   
 LEA6 0.8010 24.0851   
 LEA7 0.7947 27.7269   
RAR RAR1 0.8553 38.5360 0.6061 0.8569 
 RAR2 0.8602 35.8571   
 RAR3 0.8070 26.0362   
 RAR4 0.5491 7.3855   
TRA TRA1 0.6805 6.1983 0.6564 0.8499 
 TRA2 0.8733 16.3155   
 TRA3 0.8621 22.6795   
SAN SAN1 0.8871 55.4446 0.8147 0.9294 
 SAN2 0.9444 82.7454   
 SAN3 0.8747 32.1513   
PRV PRV1 0.7948 20.7161 0.5462 0.7821 
 PRV2 0.6581 11.3510   
 PRV3 0.7574 15.2654   
UNF UNF1 0.7676 22.1089 0.5601 0.8639 
 UNF2 0.8017 22.1503   
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Construct Code Loading T-value AVE CR 
 UNF4 0.7669 19.0669   
 UNF5 0.6890 12.6701   
 UNF6 0.7110 17.3696   
OPA OPA1 0.6162 8.2653 0.5524 0.8302 
 OPA3 0.8011 23.7254   
 OPA4 0.7895 25.4593   
 OPA5 0.7515 17.7858   
IMM IMM1 0.7199 19.9375 0.5485 0.8584 
 IMM3 0.6867 13.6543   
 IMM4 0.7316 13.5434   
 IMM5 0.7716 22.4705   
 IMM6 0.7887 23.9111   
COV COV1 0.8356 19.5299 0.6686 0.8013 
 COV2 0.7994 15.1437   
Table 7 Correlation matrix and square root of Average Variance Extracted of constructs 
 COV IMM LEA OPA PRV SAN RAR TRA UNF 
COV 0.8177
a
         
IMM 0.5597 0.7406
a
        
LEA -0.1090 -0.1301 0.7867
a
       
OPA 0.2317 0.4490 -0.0337 0.7432
a
      
PRV 0.3990 0.4209 -0.0405 0.4601 0.7391
a
     
SAN -0.1405 -0.0694 0.4103 0.0271 0.0557 0.9026
a
    
RAR -0.1913 -0.2228 0.4972 -0.0754 -0.140 0.2835 0.7785
a
   
TRA -0.0902 -0.1074 0.3079 0.1422 0.0137 0.2747 0.3141 0.8102
a
  
UNF 0.4612 0.5507 -0.1947 0.5938 0.5011 -0.072 -0.2408 -0.0698 0.7484
a
 
Note: 
a
The square root of the AVE value of each construct 
Table 8 Cross loadings for individual measurement items 
 COV IMM LEA OPA PRV SAN RAR TRA UNF 
COV1 0.8356 0.5163 -0.1244 0.1700 0.2863 -0.1166 -0.1651 -0.0234 0.4122 
COV2 0.7994 0.3943 -0.0506 0.2111 0.3705 -0.1132 -0.1473 -0.1290 0.3394 
IMM1 0.3434 0.7199 -0.0374 0.4022 0.2998 -0.0488 -0.1926 0.0369 0.5499 
IMM3 0.4502 0.6867 -0.0160 0.3282 0.2988 0.0411 -0.0428 -0.0706 0.2962 
IMM4 0.4895 0.7316 -0.1122 0.2740 0.2382 -0.1154 -0.1153 -0.1653 0.3224 
IMM5 0.3763 0.7716 -0.1206 0.3458 0.3249 -0.0188 -0.1833 -0.1083 0.3896 
IMM6 0.4300 0.7887 -0.1880 0.3049 0.3865 -0.1083 -0.2663 -0.1047 0.4506 
LEA1 -0.0222 -0.0470 0.7747 -0.0032 -0.0953 0.3719 0.4002 0.2850 -0.1607 
LEA2 -0.0600 -0.1520 0.8291 -0.0189 -0.0304 0.3658 0.4320 0.2581 -0.1592 
LEA3 -0.0746 -0.0820 0.8332 0.0497 0.0465 0.3403 0.4119 0.2079 -0.1680 
LEA4 -0.0788 -0.0601 0.7800 -0.0440 -0.0040 0.2317 0.2766 0.2790 -0.1090 
LEA5 -0.0837 -0.0529 0.6849 -0.0865 0.0256 0.1937 0.2578 0.2240 -0.1516 
LEA6 -0.1854 -0.1632 0.8010 -0.0821 -0.1172 0.3443 0.4287 0.2713 -0.1389 
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 COV IMM LEA OPA PRV SAN RAR TRA UNF 
LEA7 -0.0951 -0.1426 0.7947 -0.0166 -0.0352 0.3790 0.4947 0.1767 -0.1821 
OPA1 0.1268 0.1417 0.0249 0.6162 0.2725 0.0007 0.0507 0.1446 0.3146 
OPA3 0.2881 0.3402 -0.1177 0.8011 0.3040 -0.0219 -0.1176 0.0794 0.5065 
OPA4 0.1791 0.3517 0.0711 0.7895 0.3891 0.0590 -0.0284 0.1818 0.4163 
OPA5 0.0864 0.4454 -0.0561 0.7515 0.3925 0.0387 -0.0912 0.0396 0.4976 
PRV1 0.3165 0.2806 0.0018 0.3927 0.7948 0.0492 -0.1313 -0.0166 0.3743 
PRV2 0.2344 0.2000 0.0079 0.3021 0.6581 0.1141 -0.0721 -0.0907 0.3585 
PRV3 0.3247 0.4297 -0.0897 0.3235 0.7574 -0.0227 -0.1028 0.1140 0.3800 
SAN1 -0.2080 -0.1782 0.4279 0.0024 -0.0404 0.8871 0.3227 0.3316 -0.1097 
SAN2 -0.1115 -0.0466 0.3445 0.0728 0.1093 0.9444 0.2357 0.2025 -0.0422 
SAN3 -0.0412 0.0653 0.3252 -0.0004 0.1000 0.8747 0.1935 0.1918 -0.0334 
RAR1 -0.1899 -0.2058 0.4353 -0.0646 -0.1311 0.2254 0.8553 0.2322 -0.1889 
RAR2 -0.1398 -0.1842 0.4905 -0.0552 -0.0878 0.2650 0.8602 0.3035 -0.2144 
RAR3 -0.1410 -0.1494 0.4007 -0.0932 -0.0971 0.2227 0.8070 0.2641 -0.1889 
RAR4 -0.1342 -0.1687 0.1052 0.0016 -0.1616 0.1554 0.5491 0.1508 -0.1631 
TRA1 0.0594 0.1218 0.1021 0.0915 0.0041 0.0929 0.0636 0.6805 0.0479 
TRA2 -0.0138 -0.0370 0.2304 0.1273 0.0643 0.2215 0.2166 0.8733 -0.0035 
TRA3 -0.1737 -0.2115 0.3364 0.1223 -0.0253 0.2874 0.3727 0.8621 -0.1407 
UNF1 0.2632 0.3447 -0.2572 0.4044 0.4006 -0.0637 -0.2490 -0.1231 0.7676 
UNF2 0.3276 0.3228 -0.1138 0.3447 0.3751 -0.0078 -0.1421 -0.0553 0.8017 
UNF4 0.3383 0.3893 -0.0761 0.5198 0.4685 0.0072 -0.1378 -0.0212 0.7669 
UNF5 0.2793 0.4125 -0.0740 0.4828 0.1846 -0.1495 -0.0408 -0.0599 0.6890 
UNF6 0.4876 0.5630 -0.2010 0.4559 0.4172 -0.0634 -0.3069 -0.0118 0.7110 
Evaluation of Hierarchical Models 
Table 9 shows that all path coefficients for hierarchical models are significant 
(t-value >2.58). The values of Composite Reliability are also over 0.7, which indicates 
a satisfactory level of reliability of first-order constructs with the corresponding 
second-order construct (Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Ling et al. 2013). 
Table 9 Evaluation results of hierarchical models 
Paths Path coefficient T-value CR 
LEA→RS 0.6359 17.8615 0.9008 
RAR→RS 0.2830 10.2842  
TRA→RS 0.1428 5.2634  
SAN→RS 0.2356 8.1213  
CV→PRV 0.6857 17.1155 0.9045 
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CV→UNF 0.8629 51.1495  
CV→OPA 0.7402 17.7132  
CV→COV 0.6377 11.7899  
CV→IMM 0.8157 21.6029  
Note: RS represents for response strategies 
     CV represents for corruption vulnerabilities 
Evaluation of Structural Models 
The path coefficient between response strategies and corruption vulnerabilities has a 
t-value that is higher than 1.96, suggesting its statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
(Henseler et al. 2009). The hypothesis that response strategies are negatively 
correlated with corruption vulnerabilities is supported in the hypothesized sign. Figure 
3 shows the testing results of the hypothesized model.  
 
Response 
strategies (RS)
Corruption 
vulnerabilities 
(CV)
Leadership 
(LEA)
Procedural 
violation 
(PRV)
Unfairness 
(UNF)
Contractual 
violation 
(COV)
Opacity 
(OPA)
Immorality 
(IMM)
0.636, t=17.862
0.180, t=2.457
0.863, t=51.150
0.816, t=21.603
0.740, t=17.713
0.686, t=17.116
0.638, t=11.790
-
Training 
(TRA)
0.143, t=5.263
PRV33
COV11
COV22
OPA11
OPA33
UNF55
UNF66
PRV11
PRV22
OPA44
OPA55
IMM4I 4
IMM5I 5
IMM1I 1
IMM3I 3
UNF22
UNF44
IMM6I 6
UNF11
0.687
0.732
0.720
0.772
0.789
0.768
0.767
0.802
0.689
0.711
0.616
0.752
0.801
0.790
0.795
0.658
0.757
0.836
0.799
LEA33
LEA44
LEA11
LEA22
RAR33
RAR44
RAR11
RAR22
0.780
0.775
0.829
0.833
0.549
0.855
0.860
0.807
Rules and 
Regulations 
(RAR)
Sanctions 
(SAN)
LEA66
LEA77
LEA55
0.795
0.685
0.801
TRA22
TRA33
TRA11
0.862
0.681
0.873
SAN22
SAN33
SAN11
0.875
0.887
0.944
0.236, t=8.121
0.283, t=10.284
 
Figure 3 Testing results of the hypothesized model 
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Discussion 
Based on the PLS-SEM results, all the statistical indicators were found to be 
acceptable, which loosely supported the hypothesis in the study. Analysis results also 
revealed that four response strategies grouped under various constructs did not play an 
effective role in preventing corruption vulnerabilities as predicted in prior studies 
received. The most effective response strategy, Leadership (LEA), only received a 
path coefficient of 0.636; the path coefficients of other three strategies were about 
0.200, which were relatively low.   
Leadership 
Leadership (LEA) was regarded as the most useful response strategy in the survey, 
which has reinforced the findings of earlier studies (Sims 2000; Ashforth and Anand 
2003; Tabish and Jha 2012). Compared with western countries, leadership plays a 
more critical role in China. This can be due to the tradition of rule by man, although 
rule by law has been gradually accepted and practiced to improve the legislative and 
administrative systems in the country and it still has a long road to incorporate it into 
the existing institutions. Consequently, accountability for integrity of leadership needs 
to be improved in future public construction (People’s Liberation Army Daily 2013). 
By establishing this mechanism, leaders have duty to secure the integrity of the 
projects with the exercise of his/her leadership, which can also produce a positive 
impact on his/her subordinates’ corrupt practices.  
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Rules and Regulations 
This response strategies received a low path coefficient of 0.283 (t-value = 10.28), 
which indicated that the effectiveness of rules and regulations (RAR) is loosely 
supported by the respondents. This may be due to the fact that the existing response 
rules and regulations at the macro level are reactive, which seldom address the need 
of proactively preventing corrupt practices at the micro level (He 2000). Although the 
China government has already recognized this fact and begun promulgating a series of 
more detailed and workable rules and regulations focusing on the micro level (Legal 
Weekly 2014), such as the interpretation of issues that are applicable to the 
Disciplinary Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party because of illegal 
interference on construction projects by the leader members of the Party, and 
Implementing regulations of the Law of Bidding of People’s Republic of China 
(People Net 2010; The State Council of P.R. China 2011), which have been evidenced 
by a growing number of corruption cases revealed in recent years, it still has a long 
waiting to see the effectiveness of these new rules and regulations. 
Sanctions 
This strategy received a low path coefficient of 0.236 (t-value = 8.12). Although 
imposing serious sanctions on corrupt crimes is regarded the most useful strategy for 
preventing corruption (Tanzi 1998), the effectiveness of this strategy is merely 
regarded as acceptable by the respondents, which has echoed the belief of the Chinese 
public that only very limited suspects have receive sanctions for their corrupt crimes 
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(He 2000). In extreme cases, some suspects may be sentenced to jail for their corrupt 
crimes, but their terms of imprisonment may be commuted by paying bribery to the 
judicial department (Xinhua Net 2014). This fact has explained why the respondents 
are reluctant to provide a high evaluation on the effectiveness of sanctions (SAN). In 
order to change this situation, a series of reforms have been made by the Chinese 
Government. According to the China Ministry of Supervision, 11,273 people received 
administrative sanction, and 5,698 people received penal sanction for their corrupt 
crimes in the public construction sector between September 2009 and March 2011 
(Xinhua Net 2011), which indicated that the execution of sanctions for corruption 
crimes seems to be gradually strengthened. 
Training 
Training (TRA) received the lowest path coefficient of 0.143 (t-value = 5.26) among 
the four response strategies, which indicated that most survey respondents held a 
belief that existing training on corruption remains lacking. Undoubtedly, training is 
regarded as an indispensable response strategy for corruption prevention for its 
proactive role of forestalling corruption (Heineman and Heimann 2006). Thus, related 
training need to be implemented in all Chinese public construction projects. Zou 
(2006) stated that existing training seldom address doubts on emergent ethical 
dilemmas, such as conflicts of interest, and gift giving/receiving. Similar problems are 
common to industry practitioners as a result the inappropriate response to ethical 
dilemmas (Luo 2002). Therefore, future professional training should incorporate 
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corruption issues and help industrial professionals maintain the highest integrity 
standards. 
Conclusions  
A questionnaire survey was conducted in this study to evaluate the effectiveness of 
response strategies for vulnerabilities to corruption in the Chinese public construction 
sector. The survey results showed that the effectiveness of four response strategies, 
namely, leadership (LEA), rules and regulations (RAR), training (TRA), and sanctions 
(SAN), only achieved an acceptable level in corruption prevention. Although 
leadership (LEA) is found to be the most effective construct of response strategies and 
plays a decisive role in preventing corruption vulnerabilities, the effectiveness of this 
strategy remained limited and need to be improved in future. Conversely, the 
effectiveness of rules and regulations (RAR), sanctions (SAN), and training (TRA) 
are found to be loosely supported by the respondents, implicating more efforts should 
be directed to these aspects. The major findings of this study are beneficial to 
researchers and practitioners to get more knowledge of anti-corruption issues in 
developing countries, particularly in China. 
 The main limitation of this study lies in the sample size of the questionnaire 
survey. Although this study has made great efforts in disseminating questionnaires and 
collecting feedbacks from various regions of China, this study still has room for 
collecting more empirical data and providing stronger evidences for model validation.  
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